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THE JURY AND POPULAR CULTURE
Jeffrey Abramson*
INTRODUCTION
Ours has not been a culture that likes to tell stories about juries out-
of-school. Whether from respect for the sanctity of juries, the awe of
their oracular mystery, or just plain fear of what lay inside Pandora's
box, the law regards the jury room as virtually off limits to journalists
and outside observers.1 Even screenplay writers and novelists rarely
make jury deliberation central to the drama. There are exceptions of
course, John Grisham's The Runaway Jury being the most famous
contemporary example, the teleplay Twelve Angry Men is an older ex-
hibit.2 However, deliberation is still largely a subject waiting for its
dramatist. In fiction, as in real trials, the jury remains on the sidelines,
an audience rather than an actor, passive rather than active.
In contrast, we have vast popular literature about jury selection, de-
voted to all types of lore about the cunning of lawyers and the strate-
gies of that already legendary figure, the paid scientific jury
consultant. A familiar feature of trial coverage is the running tally
that reporters offer about how many accountants versus social work-
ers, women versus men, whites versus Hispanics have been selected to
date. This box score is updated daily and repeated throughout trial
coverage, resonating with the prevailing view that the real drama in
jury trials is played out during jury selection.
* Louis Stulberg Professor of Law and Politics, Brandeis University. Ph.D., Harvard Univer-
sity 1977; J.D., Harvard Law School 1978. Author of JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE
JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 2000).
1. In the 1950s, the University of Chicago Jury Project received permission to record secretly
the deliberations of five federal civil juries in Wichita, Kansas. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY vii (1970). Congress quickly passed an electronic eavesdropping
statute that henceforth made the presence of any recording device inside a federal jury room a
felony. Id. That law, and its state equivalents, assured that the jury would remain the least-
known component of American government. Id. In 1986, Wisconsin did grant the Public Broad-
casting Service permission to film the deliberations of a criminal jury. Frontline: Inside the Jury
Room (April 8, 1986). In 1997, CBS broadcast portions of jury deliberations from four criminal
trials in Arizona. William R. Bagley, Jr., Jury Room Secrecy: Has the Time Come to Unlock the
Door?, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 481 (1999).
2. JOHN GRisHAM, THE RUNAWAY JURY (1996); TWELVE ANGRY MEN (MGM/UA 1957).
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Legal thrillers offer rich and nuanced portraits of victims (the he-
roes and the fakes), lawyers (the crusaders and the parasites), commu-
nities (their prejudices and their sufferings), Whistleblowers (their
fates and their fortunes), witnesses (their fears and their foibles), the
cop (the crooked and the honest), and the reporter (the insider and
the outsider). However, jurors appear mostly in stock and supporting
roles such as the bribed or intimidated juror in a Mafia trial, the
planted juror in a big tobacco lawsuit, the juror in mid-vendetta or
love affair, and the juror out of his league or over his head.
If we look behind the stock-in-trade jury characters, however, popu-
lar portrayals of civil jury trials do capture great public debates about
injury and claiming in America, as well as debates about blame and
responsibility. "I'm having a hard time understanding why we're sup-
posed to make this woman a multimillionaire," a Grisham juror says
of a smoker suing the tobacco companies.3 The remark resonates with
the struggle jurors frequently go through to reconcile the deep cul-
tural norms about work and reward with the legal norms about liabil-
ity and compensation. Jury work is about constituting and
reconstituting those norms, and the best of the courtroom dramas at
least place us, the audience, in the position of the jury.
In what follows, I will outline the three great narratives by which
civil litigation unfolds in recent bestsellers and blockbuster movies.
Let me call the first narrative the populist or Jacksonian story.4 In this
narrative, as much as the common people would prefer to stay out of
politics and off juries, sometimes they are simply needed to clean out
a corrupt system. The common person responds to the moral heroism
of deserving victims whose water, air, or lungs have been poisoned by
corporate giants. The moral claims of the victims are so overwhelm-
ing, the behavior of the corporations so arrogant, that even lawyers
are transformed by civil litigation from sleazy sharks into crusaders
for a cause. This populist depiction of the morality tale inside many a
civil trial has been the central story line in a cluster of recent hits. The
first example is A Civil Action,5 a nonfiction account of the jury trial
of WR Grace and Beatrice Foods for causing cases of childhood leu-
kemia in Woburn, Massachusetts, by contaminating the town's wells
with carcinogenic chemicals. 6 The second is Erin Brockovich,7 about
3. GRISrHAM, supra note 2, at 379 (1996).
4. The names of the key narratives of American politics and culture are taken from Walter
Russell Mead's analysis of American electoral styles. Walter R. Mead, The Jacksonian Tradition
and American Foreign Policy, NAT'L INT., 1999/2000 Winter, 5.
5. JONATHAN HAmR, A CIVIL ACrION (1996). References to the Woburn trial are based on
the facts as presented in the novel, A Civil Action, and not the film version of the story.
6. Id.
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one woman's discovery of how Pacific Gas and Electric Company
poisoned the water of a California town and then conspired to cover
up its torts.8 The third example is The Runaway Jury, the Grisham
novel about corrupt Big Tobacco executives trying to buy a jury in an
anti-smoking trial. 9
The timing of these "David and Goliath" books and movies on civil
trials is itself interesting. Since the 1970s, a second narrative, the
Hamiltonian one, has told the most popular stories about civil litiga-
tion. 10 This story is all about the stupidity of setting economic policy
through jury trials. Victims are rarely deserving and always litigious,
lawyers prey upon the unfortunate, jurors are in over their heads, junk
science breeds junk lawsuits, damage awards are a crap shoot, and the
rich just cannot get justice. Hamiltonian stories are the mirror image
of populist ones: the corporation or the doctor is the victim of unsa-
vory lawyers serving shoddy victims. As to juries, the reigning
Hamiltonian punch line is that "the only difference between TV juries
and real juries is 50 IQ points."'" The recent film, The Sweet Hereaf-
ter,12 hits all the Hamiltonian high notes in its story about the unrav-
eling of a community in a small town when the outside plaintiff's
lawyer descends upon simple folk and overrides their initial honest
reaction that accidents sometimes happen.' 3
The Hamiltonian view of civil justice seemed well entrenched
through the early 1990s, as well-financed tort reform movements suc-
ceeded in capping plaintiffs lawyers' fees and setting ceilings on
awards for noneconomic injuries. The insurance industry and medical
associations were especially aggressive in waging a media campaign
for the hearts and minds of prospective jurors. For instance, the Utah
state medical association sent articles to physicians, presumably for
distribution in waiting rooms, setting out the association's views that
patients, not insurers, bore the cost of medical malpractice awards.' 4
Trial judges responded by questioning prospective jurors about their
exposure to such material, even though this meant breaking the usual
7. ERIN BROCKOVICH (Universal Studios 2000) (dramatizing a fictional story based on actual
events).
8. Id.
9. GrisHAM, supra note 2.
10. MEAD, supra note 4.
11. This joke was told to me by Robert Daddario, owner of Daddario Insurance Brokers,
Wellesley, Massachusetts.
12. The Sweet Hereafter (Fine Line 1997).
13. Id.
14. Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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rule that jurors should not be told a defendant carried liability
insurance. 15
Mark Galanter and others have pointed out that the Hamiltonian
story about civil justice is often impervious to empirical evidence that
civil juries are not as anti-business and anti-doctor as the plot line de-
mands. The narrative has some of the staying power of folklore,
anchored into a deep belief structure about the essential immorality of
damage awards that sever the connection between work and reward. 16
Although it is too early to tell, the tremendous changes in anti-to-
bacco litigation in the 1990s may signal broader changes in popular
attitudes toward civil trials and verdicts. The Hamiltonian within ju-
rors once convinced them that the story of smoking was a story of free
choice, adequate warnings, and assumption of the risk of a hazardous
habit. However, recent revelations about the efforts of tobacco com-
panies to manipulate the addictive effects of nicotine and their con-
spiracies to hide those efforts, caused a paradigm shift from stories
about free choice to stories about fraud and misrepresentation.' 7 The
scenario represents a third great narrative, the Wilsonian one, which
suddenly seems to be the dominant story about civil litigation. Wil-
sonians do not believe in bottom-up change in the same way as popu-
lists.18 While Wilsonians and populists both share a critique of
concentrated economic power and its abuses, Wilsonians rely on the
countervailing power of big government and professional elites. 19
Thus, an important part of the big tobacco story was the novel litiga-
tion strategy launched by state attorneys general in alliance with pub-
lic health professionals. As a result, the story became big government
taking on big business. The closest popular rendition of this story is
The Insider, a film in which legal change drives popular change and
litigation is carried by government and elites, not communities or the
people.20
In this article, I take a closer look at the populist, Hamiltonian, and
Wilsonian stories on civil litigation. However, allow me to make three
quick preliminary points. First, these three narratives are not unique
15. NANcy GERTNER & JUDITH MIZNER, THE LAW OF JURIES 3-41 (1997).
16. Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice Sys-
tem, 40 ARiz. L. REv. 717, 721-26 (1998); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil
Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 849, 849-99 (1998).
17. See Lynn Mather, Theorizing About Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and Tobacco
Litigation, 23 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 897, 903-25 (1998) (describing the history of litigation
against the tobacco industry).
18. Mead, supra note 4.
19. Id.
20. THm INSIDER (Touchstone Pictures 1999).
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to the civil justice debate; they are also the three great movements of
American politics. This overlap helps to explain why candidates fre-
quently campaign on a pro- or anti-civil jury platform. Second, the
best dramas about civil litigation are those, such as A Civil Action,
that expose enduring tensions between our populist and Hamiltonian
expectations about law. 2' Third, far too often the relation of jury to
popular culture is reduced to a flat, stimulus-response model, as if ju-
rors were the mechanical captives of the media and mere transmitters
of static cultural norms. Certainly, judges conduct voir dire as if cul-
tural images pour into the jury room. My favorite example of this
occurrence is the 1997 anti-tobacco lawsuit where the judge felt
obliged to ask jurors whether they had read John Grisham's skewering
of big tobacco in The Runaway Jury and if so, were they aware that it
was fiction.22 I do not doubt that novels can influence jurors, but
hardly in this direct, overnight, poisoning way. In my judgment, the
better view is to see jurors at work constituting legal norms, not
merely imbibing such norms. In civil trials, cultural norms about work
and responsibility, about the moral desert of victims are inevitably and
rightly brought into play as jurors deliberate the standards of medical
care, or the reasonable person standard as applied to artificial per-
sons. What we do not have, in our fiction or in our journalism, are
sustained accounts or imaginings of these deliberative moments where
jurors bring cultural norms to bear on the interpretation of the evi-
dence and the law. As great a script as Twelve Angry Men is, the story
of twelve white men in ties judging the guilt of a Puerto Rican kid
should not be the reigning image of the contemporary jury at work.23
II. TiH POPULIST NARRATIVE: BoTroMs-UP
Populism is a politics, often nostalgic, about honor, status, and their
threatened loss. The populist moments in the United States are peri-
odic and passing, mobilizing disengaged outsiders to redeem their
honor and place in society against corrupt insiders and establishment
elites who are destroying the people's simple way of life. For the pop-
ulist, the people are a reservoir of traditional virtues tied to honesty,
hard work, self-reliance, earning a living and taking responsibility for
one's actions. For the most part, in politics as on juries, the moral
virtues of the people-at-large are latent, most common folk preferring
to avoid courts, lawyers, jury duty, and sometimes even the voting
booth. However, there comes a time when the corruption of the
21. HARR, supra note 5.
22. MATHER, supra note 17, at 928-29; GRISHAM, supra note 2.
23. TWELVE ANGRY MEN (MGM/UA 1957).
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world invades communities, calling David into action against Goliath,
Cincinnatus from his farm, and Hercules to clean the mess out of the
Augean stables.
Recent courtroom dramas have used public health menaces to show
how downtrodden communities come reluctantly to litigation, unable
to find justice otherwise. The ideal-type populist story starts from the
bottom up, ordinary people realizing that they are victims of vicious
corporations protected by legal elites. However, as in politics gener-
ally, sometimes it takes a Jacksonian-type hero to tap into the populist
sentiments of the people and lead the charge against the established
order. Consider the Hollywood movie Erin Brockovich and the non-
fiction work A Civil Action, as two recent examples that tell populist
stories about civil litigation.24
In Erin Brockovich, a sprawling Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E)
power plant looms over the rural, low-income community of Hinkley,
California, in the Central Valley.25 To prevent corrosion to the plant's
generators, the company treats them with a type of chromium that has
carcinogenic effects on human beings. 26 However, the company dis-
poses of the chromium in holding pools without bothering even to line
the bottom of the pools adequately; the chromium seeps into the
groundwater, causing various malignancies in Hinkley residents whose
wells tap into the contaminated groundwater supply.27 PG&E is
aware of the problem but engages in a conspiracy to cover up its torts
by telling residents half-truths, sending them to company-paid doctors
who tell residents there is no connection between their ailments and
the water supply. 28
The Hinkley residents are the opposite of litigious, a sure sign of
their moral stature. If anything, they are trusting to a fault, regarding
PG&E as a good neighbor concerned enough to pay their medical
bills.29 However, Erin Brockovich, a temporary file clerk in a backwa-
ter, small general practice Los Angeles law firm, is not as trusting.30
Erin knows all about how the legal system treats ordinary people, hav-
ing recently tried to sue a doctor for ramming into her car in his
speeding Jaguar.31 The jury does not see a victim on the stand, only a
twice-divorced, unemployed mother who dresses in short skirts and
24. EIN BROCKOVICH (Universal Studios 2000); HARR, supra note 5.
25. ERrN BROCKOVICH (Universal Studios 2000).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. ERiN BROCKOVCH (Universal Studios 2000).
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high heels.32 They do not hear the facts, only her foul mouth. Once
they hear the doctor worked in an emergency room, the jury puts the
facts into the Hamiltonian narrative of an undeserving woman trying
to make a quick buck at the expense of a doctor hurrying that day to
save lives. 33 Although not from Hinkley, Erin is of Hinkley and the
dismissed and diminished of the world. 34 Once she starts filing away
folders showing PG&E buying the homes of Hinkley residents, Erin's
common sense wonders why medical bills should be tucked into a real
estate file.35 She knows a rat when she sees one and is able to mobil-
ize the community precisely because she is not a lawyer, but rather a
victim speaking to other victims and a mother speaking to other
mothers about protecting their children.36 The litigation trail in Erin
Brockovich thus starts without the presence of any lawyers.37 We live
in a world where people's injuries are severe, their medical needs
great, and the responsibility of PG&E exists beyond doubt, though
proving that responsibility is another matter.
The populism of Erin Brockovich works by trapping the audience in
its own elitist, gender-based, clothing-driven judgments about peo-
ple.3 Like the jury, we judge Erin by her outfits; a smart woman
could not possibly dress in such a way. We also mistake her male
neighbor, the long-haired, bearded and tattooed biker, who could not
possibly be sincere in his offer to baby-sit Erin's three children. 39 For
most of the movie, we expect the pony-tailed man with a baseball cap
smiling at Erin to be a stalker or a company goon. The mysterious
man turns out to be a former PG&E employee who was smart and
courageous enough to preserve incriminating documents management
once asked him to shred.40 The film is one big populist joke, all about
how the genuine moral worth and smarts of ordinary people, the
mothers of Hinkley, the employees of PG&E, the former beauty
queen of Wichita, Kansas, are constantly being underestimated.
Erin Brockovich is romantic on the subject of litigation, but displays
hostility toward lawyers. 41 "I hate lawyers, I just work for one," Erin
explains in Hinkley by way of gaining people's trust.42 The lawyer for
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. ERN BROCKOVICH (Universal Studios 2000).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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whom Erin works is low enough on the legal status ladder that he can
vaguely relate to ordinary people, although Erin has to pressure him
just to stay for a cup of coffee with his clients. The higher up an attor-
ney is on the legal chain, the less she or he is able to practice commu-
nity-based litigation. There are no movement lawyers, no devotees of
environmental causes coming to the aid of Hinkley, nor could there be
in the eyes of this film. Litigation's worth depends on its generation
from below, with law and lawyers being mere necessary instruments to
put at the disposal of the people.
As the case develops, the small-time lawyer for whom Erin works
finds it necessary to invite into the case an experienced attorney from
the upper echelons to help him both financially and legally.43 How-
ever, the establishment lawyer (male) and his young woman associate
have no street smarts, they cannot relate to the people of Hinkley who
start rebelling against representation by starched shirts and skirts.44
Unfortunately, the film makes its populist points here in gender-bi-
ased ways, singling out the young woman associate for ridicule, as if
any woman who wears a suit to work is no longer "woman" enough to
relate to housewives and mothers.45 For instance, during an in-home
interview with a family cuddling their cancer-stricken daughter on a
couch, the big-firm woman lawyer tells them that she would appreci-
ate it if they would refrain from embellishing their account with any
emotions, since they are of no legal import.46 Clearly, the populism
here turns reactionary against women as lawyers, preferring the
street-tough, one-of-us Erin. However, the film's larger message is
that civil litigation worked in Hinkley despite the best efforts of big
lawyers to sabotage the people's claims.
How did civil litigation work? The people of Hinkley expected to
get a jury trial, to have people such as themselves deliver PG&E to
judgment day.4 7 However, the big lawyers suggest that binding arbi-
tration will be quicker and more efficient. 48 It falls to the small-time
lawyer to call the six hundred plaintiffs to a town meeting and sell
them on the idea of arbitration. Although popular instincts favor the
public face juries give to justice, the lawyer reminds them that PG&E
will delay a jury trial for years and "many of you cannot afford to
wait." 49 That is the last time anyone mentions a jury trial. The arbiter
43. EirN BROCKOVICH (Universal Studios 2000).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. ERiN BROCKOVICH (Universal Studios 2000).
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comes through with $330 million, enough for each of the Hinkley re-
sidents to secure their families financially in the face of looming medi-
cal catastrophes, enough for the small-time lawyer to move into a
skyscraper, enough for Erin to receive a $2 million paycheck.50
The absence of a jury trial explains why, for all its populist senti-
ments, the film ends so quietly. The Hinkley residents do not hear of
their victory in open court, there is no public celebration or mobiliza-
tion, only Erin Brockovich driving to Hinkley to tell one mother with
breast and uterine cancer that she will be receiving $5 million.51 The
award seems just but hardly compensation for cancer. In fact, the
populist perspective persuades the audience that no amount of money
would have been adequate. Yes, litigation needs to translate injuries
into dollars, but seeing PG&E punished and held accountable is the
moral compass in Hinkley.
I suppose that judges selecting jurors this week for toxic tort cases
will be asking members of the jury venire whether any of them has
seen Erin Brockovich.52 However, screening out jurors pumped up
for a time by one particular populist-style movie is not going to keep
from juries the presence of some of the deep populist norms the
movie captures. Empirical research shows that most juries are not out
to soak the rich, stick their hands into deep pockets and hand out
other people's money to plaintiffs everywhere.5 3 In fact, the morality
of populism is strict and tight-fisted in ways that matter to civil litiga-
tion. Populists want their victims to be pure, and hardworking, self-
reliant, and reluctant to go to lawyers or enter courtrooms. They want
their injuries to be severe, caused by hazards the plaintiffs did not
even know existed. At the same time, populists are fiercely suspicious
of faceless corporations, the arrogance of power, and the lack of indi-
vidual moral responsibility for the actions of the company.54 In short,
one of the ways civil jurors hear the evidence and interpret it is by
comparison to the equities of the ideal-type populist morality tale told
in the likes of an Erin Brockovich.55
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See GALANTER, supra note 16 (summarizing empirical research on juries); ViDMAR, supra
note 16.
54. See Valerie P. Hans, The Contested Role of the Civil Jury in Business Litigation, 79 JUDICA-
TURE 242, at 246-27 (1996) (summarizing research which indicates that jurors do hold corpora-
tions to a higher standard of responsibility than non-corporate defendants).
55. ERrN BROCKOVICH (Universal Studios 2000).
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Erin Brockovich is a trifle, and its influence, if any, will pass
shortly.5 6 Jonathan Harr's A Civil Action is another matter entirely,
the rare bestseller that has crossed-over into required reading for
many law school students and undergraduates. 57 The book shows
every sign of being as influential on public opinion about civil justice
as Anthony Lewis' sympathetic recounting of Clarence Earl Gideon's
attempt to get lawyers appointed for indigent defendants was on pub-
lic opinion about criminal justice in an earlier era.58
Part of the attraction of A Civil Action to law students is the depic-
tion of the mania and obsession of a lawyer for a single case, a mania
that sometimes seems driven by money and egoism, other times by
genuine beliefs in a cause. 59 A Civil Action is far more lawyer-cen-
tered than Erin Brockovich, and it intertwines one populist story
about a small-time plaintiffs lawyer taking on big Boston Brahmin
law firms with the larger populist story of East Woburn, Massachu-
setts, versus corporations suspected of polluting town wells with
carcinogens. 60
In real life, as in the book, the story begins when neighbors seek
answers as to why a number of children have developed leukemia
within a three block area in predominantly lower middle class East
Woburn. 61 Since leukemia strikes approximately thirty-one in every
one million children, the cluster of cases in one neighborhood seemed
suspicious and alarming. 62 The neighborhood was fed by two particu-
lar town wells and the water's foul taste and smell had long prompted
complaints from residents. However, "it was the same story all the
time," Anne Anderson, mother of a three-year old leukemia victim,
told Harr. "There wasn't any problem with the water. It had been
tested and it was fine." 63 Anderson remained suspicious that there
might be a connection between the leukemia cluster and the town well
water, but for some period of time, town officials, city engineers, and
state public health departments rebuffed her inquiries. Even the lead-
ing authorities on childhood leukemia at Boston's famed Children's
Hospital were slow to realize so many of their child leukemia patients
56. Id.
57. HARR, supra note 5.
58. ArNrHo, LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
59. HARR, supra note 5.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, CANCER NET, Leukemia, at http://www.cancernet.nci.nih.
gov/Cancer-Types/Leukemia.shtml (last visited Apr. 6, 2001).
63. HARR, supra note 5, at 24.
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came from the same area. 64 Eventually, state environmental inspec-
tors found the two wells at issue to be "heavily contaminated" with
trichloroethylene (TCE) and tetrachloroethylene (Perc), two solvents
used to dissolve grease and oil on industrial equipment. 65 The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency listed both chemicals as probable car-
cinogens and the state ordered the wells to be immediately shut
down.66 At that time, there were at least twelve confirmed cases of
childhood leukemia in East Woburn.67 A report by the Center for
Disease Control confirmed that the incidence of leukemia in East
Woburn was seven times greater than should be expected. However,
the Center could not establish a definite link between the cluster and
the contaminated water.68
Long before they turned to lawyers and litigation, parents in
Woburn sought answers and respect from nearly every organ of gov-
ernment one could imagine. Eventually, some parents turned to their
minister and began organizing in church.69 Only belatedly, when they
were unable to track down those responsible for contaminating the
wells, did they turn to lawyers and litigation. A Civil Action thus be-
gins in the classic mode of a bottom-up populist story about an impov-
erished community seeking answers, not just money, from those
responsible for poisoning the blood and marrow of their children. 70
"It started out in a pure manner," one mother recalled, insisting she
was not after money. "I was doing this for my baby .... We didn't
want what happened to us to happen to anyone else." 71
What makes A Civil Action such an extraordinary legal document is
the way the author then complicates the populist plot.72 First, the par-
ents virtually disappear from the book and Harr tells the story as if
lawyers made crucial decisions at every point in the litigation in only
nominal consultation with their clients. The lead lawyer, and center of
the book's narrative, is Jay Schlichtmann, young but fresh from big
victories in other personal injury jury trials.73 Schlichtmann's motives
are mixed at best. He is maniacal when it comes to serving the inter-
ests of his clients, laying out over $2.6 million of his own or firm
64. Id. at 19-24.
65. Id. at 36.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 41.
68. Id. at 50.
69. HARR, supra note 5, at 39-41.
70. Id. at 123-46.
71. Id. at 453.
72. Id. at 56-66.
73. Id. at 56-66.
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money to prepare the Woburn case.74 For a number of years, he
clearly lives and breathes the case and puts everything else in his life
on hold, watching his car be repossessed and his overdrawn credit
cards canceled one by one.75 He is also the outsider taking on the
legal establishment, the young Jewish lawyer against the Brahmins,
the near-solo practitioner against the big firms. However, many peo-
ple in Woburn never knew what to make of Schlichtmann. He came
across to some as "not really caring about [them], using them simply
as a vehicle for his own ambition, for his own fame and fortune. '76
One mother felt as if Schlichtmann excluded her and the others from
important decisions and patronized the families "as if he were talking
to a group of children. ' 77 She stated that "[b]y the time I got through
dealing with [him], I felt violated. The lawsuit made me feel dirty. '78
One of Schlichtmann's first decisions was whom to sue, given that
the Environmental Protection Agency Superfund cleanup in Woburn
did not specify which of several industries located near the river sur-
rounding the contaminated wells might be responsible for the pollu-
tion.79 Schlichtmann's choice to single out a local tannery owned by
Beatrice Foods and a local manufacturing plant operated by chemical
giant W.R. Grace was defensible on the facts but driven also by the
"deep pockets of the corporate defendants." 80 Harr writes that
"[p]ersonal injury law is not a charitable enterprise." 81  Since
Schlichtmann was working on a contingent fee basis and paying the
investigation expenses himself, "it was crucial that the defendant ei-
ther have assets, preferably a lot of them, or a big insurance policy. '82
However, to the extent the trial was supposed to be a search for truth
about who was responsible for the contamination, Harr wonders re-
peatedly whether litigation's translation of issues into money really is
a good way to ferret out the truth.8 3
The portrait of the corporate lawyers defending their corporate cli-
ents is done more straightforwardly in the populist style. W.R.
74. Id. at 453.
75. HARR, supra note 5, at 491.
76. Id. at 453.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 78.
80. Id. at 79.
81. HARR, supra note 5, at 79.
82. Id. "Both companies ranked high in the Fortune 500. In the lexicon of personal injury
lawyers, they had 'deep pockets,' and this fact had weight for Schlichtmann.... To Schlichtmann,
having Grace and Beatrice as defendants in the case was like learning that a woman his mother
kept trying to set him up with had a huge trust fund." Id.
83. HARR, supra note 5, passim.
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Grace's Harvard Law School trained lawyer "rarely descended to the
level of personal injury law," and he set out to teach Schlichtmann "a
painful lesson" about dealing with companies like Grace.84 First, he
removes the case to federal court. Then he moves to have the case
dismissed as a "frivolous and irresponsible lawsuit" filed by a lawyer
stirring up people to sue without a single shred of evidence that Grace
was responsible for the contamination. 85 That motion is denied.
Grace later was forced to admit to its lawyers that employees had
dumped or buried far more of the chemical solvents than the company
had reported to the EPA.
As the litigation proceeds and depositions are taken, Beatrice's lead
counsel is shaken by a father's emotional recounting of the death of
his son during an emergency automobile rush to the hospital. 86 The
lawyer comes out of the deposition to tell his minions that under no
circumstances must any parent in the case ever be allowed to testify
before a jury. Were that to happen, the lawyer concedes, the case
simply is not winnable.87
The defense gets their wish when the judge bifurcates the trial, lim-
iting phase one solely to testimony about whether Beatrice and Grace
contaminated the wells. 8s Only if this "waterworks" phase of the trial
were to show that Beatrice and Grace were responsible for the pres-
ence of contaminants in the water would there be any reason to con-
tinue with testimony about whether contaminated well water could be
responsible for the leukemia and other ailments in the children of
Woburn. 89
At this point, A Civil Action exposes the tensions between our pop-
ulist and Hamiltonian takes on civil juries.90 On the one hand, by the
time the case went to trial, litigation had discovered significant mal-
feasance and cover-ups at Grace and the Beatrice-owned tannery. In-
stead of using maybe just "a few teaspoons" over the years of TCE, as
corporate Grace had told the EPA, individual Grace employees reluc-
tantly admitted in their depositions routinely throwing waste products
containing TCE into open ditches throughout the 1960s, burying at
least six corroded fifty-five gallon drums of the solvent, and perhaps
as many as fifty.91 As to the leather tannery, records from the 1950s
84. Id. at 98-99.
85. Id. at 100.
86. Id. at 154-55.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 286.
89. HARR, supra note 5, at 287.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 155-78.
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showed it already dumping tannery waste on the fifteen acres it owned
along the river. 92 Neighbors referred to the area as the tannery's own
"toxic waste dump" and told stories of trucks disposing of barrels
marked with the red X for poison.93 The revelations made during dis-
covery are so shocking and cumulative that A Civil Action makes a
powerful case for the importance of civil litigation as a way to break
the corporate code of silence.94 Indeed, deposition taking emerges in
A Civil Action as high populist drama, as blue-collar workers for
Grace realize they belong more to the affected community than the
corporation. 95
On the other hand, Harr's story switches from populist to
Hamiltonian when the jury retires to decide its verdicts. Things might
have gone better for the plaintiffs, Harr intimates, had the judge per-
mitted Schlichtmann to open with the "human drama about the
poisoning of the Woburn families."' 96 In bifurcating the trial, the judge
forced the plaintiffs to open with the "essentially bloodless" issues of
geology and groundwater movement. 97 Trial testimony was mostly
technical, requiring jurors to decipher expert accounts of the rate at
which solvents dissolve, enter groundwater flow, percolate into aqui-
fers, and emerge into well water.98 Plaintiffs had to convince the jury
not only that Grace and Beatrice dumped chemicals, not only that
those chemicals migrated into the wells, but also that the migration
occurred before children started to get sick. 99
Reconstructing jury deliberations from interviews with several of
the six jurors, Harr depicts them as confused, divided, and finally not
up to the task. 1°° Deadlocked for days, jurors resolve to reach a ver-
dict only when the foreman tells them that "he is scheduled for heart
bypass surgery and will have to leave the jury in a few days." 10' The
factions on the jury then essentially split the difference by agreeing to
find Grace, but not Beatrice, responsible for contaminating the
wells.' 02 As to a specific question calling on them to fix the earliest
date at which Grace chemicals substantially contributed to contamina-
tion of the wells, the jurors accepted one juror's suggestion of "Sep-
92. Id. at 185.
93. Id. at 187-98.
94. HARR, supra note 5, passim.
95. Id. at 164-68.
96. Id. at 287, 390.
97. Id. at 286-87.
98. Id. at 291-403.
99. Id. at 286-403.
100. HARR, supra note 5, at 381-92.
101. Id. at 391.
102. Id. at 391-93.
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tember, 1973" even though "they had no idea what relation it bore to
the question. ' 10 3 Since several of the plaintiffs' children had fallen ill
of leukemia before September of 1973, the choice of date seemed
arbitrary. 104
The fault was not entirely the jury's inability to decipher the scien-
tific evidence.10 5 The questions the judge required them to answer
''were all but impossible to understand" and they called on juries to
come up with more definite answers about dates of contamination
than scientists themselves could give.106 A Civil Action is especially
harsh on the judge for structuring the trial purposely to keep jurors
from hearing the moving stories of parents regarding their children's
diseases. 0 7 Hamiltonian to a fault, the judge took a case about leuke-
mia and turned it into a case about geology and groundwater. 08 The
judge essentially took the jury out of the case, first by keeping the
parents out of court, then by forcing jurors to determine not only
whether Grace and/or Beatrice contaminated the wells, but exactly
when the contamination occurred. The judge justified his decisions as
necessary if law, not emotion, were to rule jurors. However, A Civil
Action is an important populist document because it undermines the
judge's claim to dispassion and neutrality. The judge's personal hostil-
ity to Schlichtmann is apparent throughout trial, as is his fondness and
respect toward Beatrice's lead counsel, an old law school classmate of
the judge.'0 9 To witness the partiality of the judge is to remember why
we need juries in the first place.
Still, A Civil Action is a story without a happy populist ending. As
to Beatrice, the jury probably got it wrong; an EPA report after the
trial noted that "the Beatrice land was the most grossly contaminated
area in the aquifer, and by far the largest contributor to the pollution
of the wells."' 10 More generally, A Civil Action suggests that truths of
the sort the Woburn parents sought probably were not to be found in
a courtroom, and that "perhaps the case was one that the judicial sys-
tem was not equipped to handle.""'
A Civil Action does spend more pages trying to reconstruct the
jury's deliberation than do most books of this genre. Still, the one
103. Id. at 392.
104. Id. at 394.
105. Id. at 456.
106. HA JR, supra note 5, at 368-69.
107. Id. at 258-88.
108. Id.
109. Id. 87-488.
110. Id. at 456.
111. Id. at 369.
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chapter devoted to the jury is entitled "The Vigil," and the drama
stays with Schlichtmann as he keeps a lonely watch each day in the
courtroom corridor waiting for the jury to return its verdicts. 112 Fur-
thermore, A Civil Action reinforces the view that jury trials are a mys-
tery, you never know what is going on in the minds of jurors until it is
too late. The image of the jury as a "black box" is what drives popular
culture to be fascinated with jury selection and lawyerly attempts to
do the equivalent of stuffing the ballot box. During jury selection,
Schlichtmann's profile of the ideal juror was a young housewife with
children the same ages as the victims. 113 However, the defense chal-
lenged most such women for cause, arguing that "it's very difficult for
any woman with small children to decide the case on the evidence
rather than emotion, [it is] almost an impossible task.' 14 In the end,
only one juror selected had young children and she was an alter-
nate. 1 5 Many prospective jurors were excused after acknowledging
they would tend to believe big corporations were reckless with the
environment.1 6 The jury of six finally chosen consisted of three men,
a telephone company foreman, a self-employed housepainter, and a
postal worker, and three women, an unmarried clerk for an insurance
company, a grandmother who drove a forklift part-time for a depart-
ment warehouse, and a church organist. 1 7 Whether a group with
these backgrounds was competent to decipher the geological evidence
and the groundwater flow testimony remains an unanswered question
in the book.
What we do know is that counsel on both sides assumed jurors do
not decide cases entirely according to the evidence. That is why de-
fense counsel worried so much about the sheer emotional impact of
parents on the stand. That is why Schlichtmann paid attention to who
led the jurors to the cafeteria to lunch, who smiled at him, who
seemed the sort of man unlikely to go against the majority, whom he
just liked instinctively, and whom he distrusted for being "thin [and]
rather severe-looking."118 This inside detail about what it supposedly
takes to win a jury trial is a skeptical commentary on the populist
expectations for litigation. A case that promised to expose polluters
and determine the cause of the Woburn leukemia cluster ended with a
confusing jury verdict, the granting of a new trial to Grace and an
112. HARR, supra note 5, at 377401.
113. Id. at 281.
114. Id. at 282.
115. Id. at 284.
116. Id. at 282.
117. Id. at 284, 382.
118. HARR, supra note 5, at 382.
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eventual $8 million settlement that provided families with some
money but no satisfaction that anyone had ever been brought to jus-
tice or made to admit responsibility for their children's ills and
deaths. 119 As the minister who first helped organize the Woburn com-
munity put it, "taking Grace's money without a full disclosure by the
company, or any expression of atonement, cheapened everything."'1 20
He recalled the words of one mother near the beginning, "that what
she wanted was for J. Peter Grace to come to her front door and
apologize.1t21
III. THE HAMILTONIAN NARRATIVE: BoTroM FEEDERS
Hamiltonianism is the politics that popularized the slogan, "What's
good for General Motors is good for America." Traditionally the
politics of big business, it is increasingly the politics of small business
when it comes to civil litigation. Hamiltonians judge the jury solely in
terms of economic efficiency and rationality, they have no use for the
jury's wider democratic aspiration to reflect social values or even to
forge new norms. If we have to live with civil juries at all, Hamiltoni-
ans want their verdicts predictable, and their damage awards capped.
Especially when it comes to complex commercial litigation,
Hamiltonians have been arguing for some time that the new economy
and new medical technology make jurors obsolete, amateurs out of
their league when it comes to understanding statistical analysis in anti-
trust cases, probabilities and risk assessment in products liability trials,
and standards of care among neo-natologists.
Hamiltonians are the great distributors of stories about the sup-
posed redistributive instincts of civil jurors, even when evidence sug-
gests otherwise. Hamiltonians remain sure that jurors: (1) despise the
rich, especially doctors, (2) have it in for big corporations, (3) love to
put their fingers in deep pockets and redistribute other people's
money, and (4) break deadlocks by deciding no harm will be done by
holding defendants liable, since their insurance companies will pick up
the tab.
The Hamiltonian story works by finding some "poster boy" to re-
present juries out of control. Anecdote is the best vehicle of ridicule
and the Hamiltonians understand how to use the media's thirst for the
latest scoop about jurors acquitting Imelda Marcos and then having
roast pig with her at a lavish party that night, or about the jury that
119. Id. at 442-53.
120. Id. at 452.
121. Id.
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confessed that in calculating its $10.5 billion award to Pennzoil against
Texaco it added "$1 billion to the award for each of the Texaco wit-
nesses they had most despised."'1 22 Almost everyone will have heard
the tale of how some jury in New Mexico awarded $2.9 million to a
woman burned by McDonald's coffee. 123 Then there is the one about
the woman who sued for loss of her psychic powers after a CT scan,
the prison inmate who sued himself for violating his own civil rights
when he went to prison for twenty years on burglary convictions, or
the West Virginia employee who parlayed a complaint that she hurt
her back opening a pickle jar into a $2.7 billion award of compensa-
tory and punitive damages. 124 Peter Huber's articles in Forbes maga-
zine popularized the term "junk science" to summarize the way frauds
were supposedly driving litigation. 25
Galanter and others have described in detail the "entrepreneurial
publicity" machines and public relations offices churning out
Hamiltonian stories about juries since the 1970s.126 According to pol-
ling data from the early 1990s, business elites were particularly prone
to hold a negative view about injured victims seeking big money, law-
yers serving them, and juries instinctively favoring plaintiffs. 127 More
generally, pollsters found that "the higher the family income and so-
cioeconomic status, the more critical" adults were of civil litigation.128
In contrast, "those who see lawyers in a more favorable light.., tend
to be downscale, women, minorities, and young."1 29
Such polling data raises serious questions about how juries deliber-
ate. If income, educational level, and to some extent gender are
predictors of who views civil lawsuits from a Hamiltonian rather than
populist perspective, then jury justice is precariously poised on de-
mography and on the fine tactics of jury selection. However, I suspect
that the line between Hamiltonians and populists in America is more
122. STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERIcAN COURTROoM 45
(1994).
123. GALANTER, supra note 16, at 731-34.
124. Id. at 726-28; Stuart M. Gerson, et al., Civil Justice Reform: What Now?, 1996 NAT'L
LEGAL CTR. FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, D.C. 1. Hamiltonian accounts of the McDonald's case
conveniently leave out details such as the skin grafts the plaintiff needed or her initial rejected
request for payment of her medical bills and other expenses, about $11,000 Liebeck v. McDon-
ald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (N.M. Dist. 1999).
125. GALANTER, supra note 16, at 728 (citing Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom,
FORBES, July 8, 1991, at 68 and PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 3-4 (1991)).
126. GALANTER, supra note 16, at 731.
127. Id. at 721.
128. Id. at 720 (quoting PETER D. HART RESEARCH Assocs., A SURVEY OF THE ATrrruDEs
NATIONWIDE TOWARD LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL SYsTEM 4-5 (1993)).
129. Id.
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fluid than the polls indicate. Jurors across the economic spectrum will
hear a mix of populist and Hamiltonian tales in many a victim's woes.
After all, most Americans hold to the Protestant ethic, to the moral
value of hard work, of earning what you keep and keeping what you
earn. Defense arguments about plaintiffs getting something for noth-
ing, and lawsuits becoming lotteries, will resonate with these
Hamiltonian receptors that transcend class in America. 130 For in-
stance, in A Civil Action, the juror most resistant to holding the corpo-
rations liable was a self-employed house painter.131 In John
Grisham's The Runaway Jury, big tobacco defendants find an immedi-
ate ally in a retired army colonel and former smoker. 132 Since he "had
the good sense to quit," he is irked by a plaintiff shirking responsibil-
ity for his own habits.' 33 The juror sarcastically stated, "I think people
should have more sense than to smoke three packs a day for almost
thirty years. What do they expect? Perfect health?"' 134
Valerie Hans, Shari Seidman Diamond, and Neil Vidmar have all
reported recent surveys that show broad segments of the American
public espousing Hamiltonian views about a litigation explosion
caused by unsavory plaintiffs' lawyers serving undeserving clients. 35
In a 1996 report of her research to date, Hans found that more than
eighty percent of jurors interviewed believed that there were too
many frivolous lawsuits. Only about one-third thought that plaintiffs
generally have legitimate grievances. Jurors reported to Hans that
they speculated on the motives of plaintiffs for bringing the suits at
least as much as on the behavior of defendants. 136 Vidmar's research
is consistent in finding a broad tendency for jurors to blame, rather
than sympathize, with personal injury victims.' 37
One of Hans' most telling observations is how quickly the populist
story unravels when jurors lose faith in the victim's credibility.' 38 In
Erin Brockovich and A Civil Action, litigation gives us the ideal-type
130. See David M. Engle, The Ovenbird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an
American Community, 18 LAW & Soc. REv. 551 (1984).
131. HARR, supra note 5, at 382-91.
132. GRISHAM, supra note 2, at 87.
133. Id. at 88.
134. Id.
135. Valerie P. Hans, Attitudes Toward the Civil Jury: A Crisis of Confidence, in VERDICr:
ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 248, 257-61 (Robert E. Litan ed. 1993); Shari Seidman Dia-
mond, What Jurors Think: Expectation and Reactions of Citizens Who Serve as Jurors, in VER-
Dicr: ASSESSING TriE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 282, 299-300 (Robert E. Litan ed. 1993); VIDMAR,
supra note 16, at 854.
136. See Hans, supra note 54, at 244-45.
137. VIOmAR, supra note 16, at 866-70.
138. HANs, supra note 54, at 244-45.
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victim, mothers with dying children. Judged against this image of the
morally deserving claimant, real cases often disappoint jurors' populist
expectations and leave them ripe for Hamiltonian conclusions.
The recent film, The Sweet Hereafter, tells the Hamiltonian story of
the pied piper plaintiff lawyer who leads a simple community to moral
ruin. 39 Like Erin Brockovich or A Civil Action, the film begins with
an accident in a small, low-income community.' 40 This time, however,
there is no villainous corporation set against the town, only a school
bus being driven cautiously along icy roads by the town's own loving
bus driver, a middle-aged woman who keeps pictures of all the school
kids in her house.141 The school bus hits a patch of ice, skids through
a guardrail, and crashes down a ravine. 142 Twenty-two children are
killed, one teenage girl left paralyzed. 143 A father of two of the dead
children was behind the bus when it flipped.144 Despite his grief, he
understands that the accident was no one's fault.145 Also understand-
ing are the rest of the parents, who originally stand in common grief
with the devastated driver.' 46 However, then an attorney from the big
city arrives and sells some parents on the theory that there must have
been a failure on the bus owing to defective equipment or negligent
maintenance. 47 The attorney himself does not believe the claim but
he sells it to parents on a "you owe it to your children to make sure
this never happens to anyone else" sermon.' 48 Some parents are re-
luctant, others are greedy in ways that begin to undermine the roman-
tic view of the virtuous rural community. 49 The father of the
paralyzed child had long dreamed of a rags to riches singing career for
her, now he seizes on civil litigation as a replacement enrichment
strategy. 50 The lawsuit eventually sets father against daughter, neigh-
bor against neighbor. However, what else should one expect from the
big city lawyer?' 5 ' In a Hamiltonian metaphor for our time, the law-
yer negotiates with his own daughter only by cell phone and has lost
139. Tm SWEET HEREAFTER, supra note 12.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. THE SWEET HEREAFTER, supra note 12.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. THE SWEET HEREAFTER, supra note 12.
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her to a life of drugs and finally to an HIV infection. 152 The lawyer's
arrival in the small community is the arrival of all the vices that li-
tigousness breeds.
IV. THE WILSONIAN NARRATIVE: Tops DOWN
Wilsonian politics are not nostalgic the way populism sometimes is,
romantically yearning for pre-corporate America. From the begin-
ning of the last century, Wilsonians accepted that bigness and corpo-
rate entities were here to stay and were the coming sources of national
wealth and rising standards of living. However, big business de-
manded big government to regulate and curb the abuses of concen-
trated economic power. Wilsonian politics and trust busting were
born. Whereas the populist story is bottom-up, the people rising to rid
their communities of Goliath, Wilsonian stories start with elites using
the force of law and the power of government to engineer social
change.
The Insider, a recent movie about the fatal combination of big me-
dia and big tobacco, is an example of the Wilsonian stories just now
being constructed in the course of anti-tobacco litigation. 153 Allow me
to set the scene. From 1965 (when the Surgeon General's warning
first appeared on cigarette packs) until 1995, smokers or the families
of deceased smokers filed more than seven hundred lawsuits against
cigarette companies. 154 Only one jury in all those cases ever ruled for
the plaintiffs, and that verdict was overturned on appeal.1 55 In those
years, the tobacco industry told the better story of who was responsi-
ble for a smoker's illness, at least as far as juries were concerned.
Again, Grisham's Runaway Jury is a suggestive guide here. 56 The
most prejudiced juror against the dying smoker is the ex-smoker who
might think to himself: "The warning is on the pack, the product is
lethal, I quit, he didn't, he got what he deserved."'1 57 Strange as it
seems, tobacco companies successfully held the moral high ground in
jury trials, crafting a defense around free choice, assumption of the
risk, and responsibility for one's own acts. How was this hold of the
tobacco industry over jurors to be broken?
To a certain extent, public opinion about smoking was already
changing dramatically through the 1980s, thanks to the public's in-
152. Id.
153. THE INSIDER, supra note 20.
154. MATH-LER, supra note 17, at 904-05.
155. Id.
156. GRISHAM, supra note 2.
157. Id. at 88.
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creased awareness that secondary smoke harmed the health even of
those who chose not to smoke. 158 What was once seen as classic self-
regarding action harming only the person smoking was fast becoming
an other-regarding act with public health implications. 159 Bans on
smoking in restaurants and public spaces began sprouting up in city
after city. 160 However, The Insider suggests that litigation took a lead-
ing role in changing the story we tell about cigarettes. 161 The new
litigation brought together several elites: state attorneys general, pub-
lic health professionals, well-financed trial lawyers with a war chest
accumulated from asbestos and other product liability litigation, disaf-
fected executives from big tobacco, and liberal media types.
In the background of the action depicted in The Insider is a novel
lawsuit filed in 1994 by the Mississippi State Attorney General to
recoup the state's Medicaid and other expenses incurred by treating
health problems attributable to smoking.' 62 This was an ingenious
paradigm shift, from the injuries of arguably undeserving smoking
plaintiffs to the injuries of an innocent public nevertheless required to
deplete the state treasury while money flowed into the coffers of big
tobacco. The Mississippi Attorney General noted, "the industry can-
not claim that a smoker knew full well what risks he took each time he
lit up. The state of Mississippi never smoked a cigarette."'1 63 The new
litigation was also an example of state power taking on private eco-
nomic power.
In The Insider, the Mississippi lawsuit gets a boost when Jeffrey
Wigand, a former executive at Brown and Williamson, gives deposi-
tion testimony that the heads of the big tobacco companies lied to
Congress when they swore that, to their knowledge, nicotine was not
addictive.' 64 Wigand, the classic insider turned whistleblower, pro-
vided information showing not only that the heads of big tobacco
knew nicotine was addictive, but that they authorized steps to spike
the levels of nicotine to keep people hooked.165 What was once a
story about warnings and free choice henceforth became a story about
misrepresentation, fraud, and the intentional marketing of an addic-
tive drug.' 66 In 1998, in the largest settlement of a civil lawsuit in his-
158. MATHER, supra note 17, at 905-06.
159. Id. at 905.
160. Id. at 906.
161. TI INSIDER, supra note 20.
162. MATHER, supra note 17, at 910.
163. Id. at 911.
164. THE INSIDER, supra note 20.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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tory, the tobacco companies agreed to settle the outstanding claims of
forty-six states for $206 billion. 167 In March of 2000, a San Francisco
jury awarded a woman dying of smoking-caused illness $20 million in
compensatory and punitive damages.168 In a class-action lawsuit
brought on behalf of all Florida smokers, a jury has already held com-
panies responsible and is now considering damage awards that could
run into the billions of dollars.169
Within the space of six years, the litigation launched by the Missis-
sippi Attorney General has thus brought about tremendous change in
the tobacco wars. New legal norms propelled elites into action and
changed the way the public at large conceived of the equities between
smokers and corporation. However, as opposed to the populist narra-
tive of litigation rising up from the victims, the success here comes
from state power taking on big tobacco. In this battle between big
government and big tobacco, a key issue is who will get to big media.
The Insider is a film about the lengths big tobacco went to enlist The
Wall Street Journal and other conservative media outlets in its efforts
to assassinate Jeffrey Wigand's character. 170 Capitulating to market
pressures, CBS executives canceled a scheduled interview with
Wigand on 60 Minutes.71 Only the skills of another consummate in-
sider, 60 Minutes producer Lowell Bergman, were able to save
Wigand's reputation, call off The Wall Street Journal, and eventually
get the Wigand interview aired on 60 Minutes.1 72
All in all, recent developments in tobacco litigation fit a Wilsonian
model where state power is necessary to check concentrations of pri-
vate power and where litigation can hammer out new paradigms and
new norms in ways that then activate others, change public opinion,
and eventually show up in jury verdicts premised on a new moral nar-
rative about smoking and responsibility. In addition, recent state law-
suits against gun producers seeking recovery of the costs of treating
167. The tobacco industry had already agreed to pay $40 billion to settle the claims of four
states. MATHER, supra note 17, at 898. A previous settlement agreement reached in 1997 would
have obligated the companies to pay $368.5 billion and to finance national anti-smoking pro-
grams, but that settlement required congressional and presidential approval and it fell apart. Id.
168. Judge Refuses to Overturn $21 Million Verdict Against PM and RJR, 15 No. 13 ANDREWS
TOBACCO INDUST. LrIG. REP., June 16, 2000, at 8.
169. Tobacco Companies Ordered to Pay $145 Billion in Punitive Damages, 15 No. 15 AN-
DREWS TOBACCO INDUST. LrII. REP., July 14, 2000, at 3.
170. THE INSmER, supra note 20.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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gunshot victims demonstrates how a legal norm starting with tobacco
may have implications elsewhere. 173
As of this writing, the end results of the new litigation strategies
cannot be predicted. Some wonder where social engineering by litiga-
tion will go from here. Will there be lawsuits against the dairy indus-
try for giving us cholesterol? Wilsonians worry about a new power
elite of lawyers end-running the legislature and using "impact litiga-
tion" to pursue their own reform agenda, accountable to no public
authority. 174 Doubts such as these show that the new litigation may
produce a Hamiltonian counteraction. In March of 2000, the New
York Times featured a front-page article tracing the flow of money
from plaintiff lawyers enriched by the tobacco settlements to Demo-
cratic Party candidates committed to resisting tort reform legisla-
tion.' 75 Two days prior, the Supreme Court ruled that the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) lacked statutory authority to regulate
nicotine as a drug. 76 As a result, the battle continues over the best
story to tell about civil litigation over tobacco. Is this suit the mother
lode of all lawsuits, bringing windfall profits to elite lawyers but little
health protection to the public? Or is tobacco litigation a triumphant
display of the power of activist lawyers to take down a corporate men-
ace in control of government all the way from jury to Congress?
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has set forth three narratives around which jurors con-
struct facts and interpret the law in civil trials. Populists tell stories
from the bottom up, victims recouping their honor by taking on the
giant corporations destroying their communities. Lawyers are rarely
the driving forces in populist narrative, they are more likely to be
saved and uplifted by the company of ordinary people than the other
way around.
Hamiltonians tell a mirror-image story, about victimized corpora-
tions and fraudulent plaintiffs served by the big industry of trial law-
yers. The undeserving poor in popular welfare legends easily translate
into the undeserving plaintiffs in popular jury lore. "Popular justice"
173. Smith & Wesson Signs Settlement Agreement with Government, 11 No. 2 ANDREWS CON-
SUMER PROD. LmG. REP., May 1, 2000, at 5; Gun Makers Seek Dismissal of St. Louis Suit, 10
No. 11 ANDREWS CONSUMER PROD. LMG. REP., January 2000, at 9.
174. Barry Meier, Bringing Lawsuits to do What Congress Won't, N.Y. TIMES, March 26,2000,
§ 4, at 3.
175. Leslie Wayne, Trial Lawyers Pour Money into Democrats' Chests, N.Y. TIMES, March 23,
2000, at Al.
176. Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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is an oxymoron for Hamiltonians. Lawyers are no better than are
pickpockets who like their pockets deep.
Wilsonians believe that law, lawyers, and trials can force and direct
social change by pushing for new norms. Law never floats free of
public opinion and cultural practices, but trials and juries can reconsti-
tute norms in ways that energize social forces ready to apply the
norms in practice.
There used to be a fourth narrative about juries and civil litigation.
It was the story Alexis de Tocqueville told about the American jury, a
more robustly democratic story than is told by any of the three surviv-
ing narratives.177 I close by recounting Tocqueville's democratic dis-
course on the civil jury, as a way to show the limits of contemporary
aspirations for the civil jury.17 8
Tocqueville purposely refrains from defending the jury, whether
civil or criminal, as a way of deciding cases.179 "If it were a question
of deciding how far the jury, especially the jury in civil cases, facili-
tates the good administration of justice, I admit that its usefulness can
be contested."'180 Indeed, already in the 1830s, the French visitor had
heard arguments that the complexity of modem lawsuits outstripped
the competence of jurors as fact finders.' 8 ' The jury arose "in the
infancy of society, at a time when only simple questions of fact were
submitted to the courts.' 82 Adapting the jury "to the needs of a
highly civilized nation, where the relations between men have multi-
plied exceedingly," is "no easy task."'' 8 3
However, "arguments based on the incompetence of jurors in civil
suits carry little weight with me," Tocqueville continued. 184 Partly he
thought the concern with "the enlightenment and capacities" of jurors
was misplaced, as if the jury were merely a "judicial" institution to be
judged narrowly by its use to litigants.' 8 5 More crucially, Tocqueville
saw the assessment of juror qualifications as too static, unmindful of
the moral uplift and civic education that comes from investing citizens
with responsibility for justice. 186 This is the part of the Tocquevillian
narrative that has wholly dropped out of contemporary conversation
177. See AL.EXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270-76 (Anchor Books 1969).
178. See id.
179. Id. at 270-71.
180. Id. at 271.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 177, at 271.
184. Id. at 275.
185. Id. at 272-73.
186. Id. at 273-75.
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about the civil jury.187 Ultimately, the jury for Tocqueville was rightly
as much a political as a legal institution.188 The jury was as character-
istic of democracy as universal suffrage. 189 Juries took an abstract
ideal such as "popular sovereignty" and "really puts control of society
into the hands of the people."'19
Applied to the criminal jury, Tocqueville's emphasis on the jury as a
political institution is familiar.' 91 Even today, we continue to value
the criminal jury as a forum for popular input into the law.192 How-
ever, descriptions of the civil jury as a "political body" are far more
jarring to the contemporary ear.193 Nevertheless, Tocqueville be-
lieved the civil jury was more important than the criminal jury as a
way of empowering and educating citizens for self-government. 94
The civil jury of the 1830s was "one of the most effective means of
popular education at society's disposal."'195 The jury was "a free
school which is always open," a place where ordinary citizens rub
elbows with the "best-educated" and gain "practical lessons in the
law."'1 96 Service on civil juries was the principal reason a broad seg-
ment of the American public came into "political good sense."' 97
Criminal trials involve the people only "in a particular context," but
civil litigation "impinges on all interests" and "infiltrates into the busi-
ness of life."'1 98 Few people can imagine themselves a defendant in a
criminal trial.199 However, "anybody may have a lawsuit. '' 2°° There-
fore, "[e]ach man, when judging his neighbor, thinks that he may be
judged himself."'201 In this way, civil juries "teach men equity in
practice." 202
Far from fomenting class divisions and rich versus poor adversary
relations, civil juries moderate popular passions by establishing the
judge as legal tutor for jurors. 20 3 Law is the only aristocratic force left
187. Id.
188. Id. at 272-74.
189. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 177, at 273.
190. Id. at 272-73, 275.
191. Id. at 274-75.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 177, at 275.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 274.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 177, at 274.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 275-76.
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in America, Tocqueville thought, and via the jury, it extends its empire
over the common person.204 "[T]he legal spirit penetrate[s] right
down into the lowest ranks of society. ''20 5
Tocqueville's republican narrative of the civil jury as a crucible of
democratic learning is fairly unspoken in America. Hamiltonians
scoff at the idea that ordinary people can be brought up to speed by
some ritualistic recital of legal instructions. Wilsonians agree that law
is a matter for professional elites, not amateurs. Only populists re-
main enticed by the ideal of participatory democracy. Ultimately,
populists lack patience to practice the ideal; they would rather stay
home and are aroused to wrest control back from elites only when
betrayed. Therefore, the populist tells great stories about muscular
juries delivering an occasional blow for the people. However, they do
not tell Tocqueville's kind of story, the republican story about the
daily, undramatic work of juries, and the slow ways jury duty incul-
cates habits of persuasion and deliberation, the civic virtues of collec-
tive argument upon which self-government depends. For all the
popularity of the courtroom drama, there remains no drama since
Twelve Angry Men that centrally portrays the dynamics of jury
deliberation.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 276.
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